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Abstract 
We consider the impact of adoption of a low priority initiative in some jurisdictions within 
Los Angeles County on police behavior. Low priority initiatives instruct police to make 
the enforcement of low level marijuana possession offenses their “lowest priority.” Using 
detailed data from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and a difference-in-
differences strategy, we show that the mandate resulted in a lower arrest rate for 
misdemeanor marijuana possession in adopting areas. However, the lower relative arrest 
rate is driven by a spike in the arrest rate in areas not affected by the mandate rather than a 
reduction in adopting areas.   
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I. Introduction 
Since the 1990s, there have been ongoing drug crime reforms by state and local 
jurisdictions throughout the U.S.  Several of these changes have focused on marijuana 
laws, typically driven by changing public perceptions regarding marijuana.  In 1996, 
California became the first state to allow medical cannabis, with 22 more states and 
Washington, DC legalizing as of 2015.1  In 2014, Congress “quietly” ended the federal 
ban on medical cannabis.2  Even more dramatically, in 2012 Colorado and Washington 
voted to legalize recreational cannabis use and Alaska, Oregon, and Washington, DC 
followed suit in 2014.3  While public perceptions may be changing towards marijuana, 
and legislative changes and voter initiatives may be telling the criminal justice system to 
ignore these offenses, this does not necessarily mean that police officers, prosecutors, and 
judges are following the wishes of lawmakers and the public (Tonry, 1996).   
In this paper, we look at the impact of the adoption of a low priority initiative on 
police behavior in Los Angeles County.  Low priority initiatives were local mandates that 
stated police should make the enforcement of minor marijuana offenses the “lowest 
enforcement priority.”  Within Los Angeles County, two jurisdictions adopted such 
initiatives - Santa Monica and West Hollywood.  While local policy makers and voters 
may want such a policy in place, this does not necessarily mean police officers/chiefs do 
not have their own views on marijuana, or other biases, that may cause them to act in 
contrast to the views of the public. We therefore examine if, after the adoption of a low 
                                                        
1 http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 
2 http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-medical-pot-20141216-story.html 
3 http://www.drugpolicy.org/marijuana-legalization-and-regulation 
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priority initiative, there is differential enforcement of police agencies across different 
types of marijuana crimes, across areas within their jurisdiction, or across race. 
Our research relates to a growing literature that examines various mechanisms 
that may affect police behavior. Several papers have looked at how changing the 
incentives of police through the War on Drugs affected how police allocated their time, 
and the impact of this reallocation of time on other types of crime (Benson and 
Rasmussen, 1991; Benson et. al., 1992; Benson, et al., 1994; Benson et al., 1995; Benson 
et al., 1998; Sollars et al., 1994).4  In addition, there are differences in the response of law 
enforcement based on the experience of the police officers (DeAngelo and Owens, 
2015).5  There is also a growing literature on how police behavior may respond to 
changes in the economic situation of a county, arguing that when a local area is 
struggling, police officers issue more traffic tickets in order to generate revenues 
(DeAngelo and Hanson, 2014; Makowsky and Stratmann, 2009; Makowsky and 
Stratmann, 2011). 
 To conduct our analysis, we use a unique data set on arrests obtained from the Los 
Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD).  This data set gives us the unique opportunity to 
study various mechanisms that may be in play regarding how these policies affected 
police behavior. First, the LASD office has jurisdiction throughout the county, covering 
multiple municipalities. However, only two jurisdictions in LA County enacted low 
priority laws, West Hollywood and Santa Monica (but Santa Monica has its own police                                                         
4 Ross and Walker (2015) found that police officers in the state of California followed the mandate and 
arrested fewer individuals, but that there was no measurable deterrent effect of the initiative on other types 
of felony crimes. 
5 Leaver (2009) and DeAngelo and McCannon (2015) develop game theoretical models showing the 
tradeoff of regulators/police officers between properly applying the law, changing public perceptions, and 
societal norms and outcry related to the actions of a regulator. Lum and Nagin (2015) also discuss the role 
of citizen reactions to police behavior. 
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force and thus the LASD does not have primary patrol over this area). Therefore, while 
the LASD are responsible for patrolling the overwhelming majority of Los Angeles 
County, only one municipality within its purview passed a low priority law initiative. 
This allows us to see if the policy change caused officers to adjust their behavior in 
general throughout the county, or if they only adjusted their behavior in the sole adopting 
jurisdiction. 
 Furthermore, our data includes information on the race of the individual arrested. 
This allows us to see another dimension along which police officers could have changed 
their behavior by targeting a specific race. Specifically, we examine whether the 
relaxation of misdemeanor drug crime laws has a symmetric impact across races, or if a 
specific race (or group of races) are disproportionately impacted by these legal changes.  
In our analysis we focus specifically on white versus nonwhite individuals. 
 To determine the effect of low priority initiatives on police behavior, we rely on a 
difference-in-differences estimation strategy. We include reporting area fixed effects to 
control for unobservable heterogeneity of the locality, year-by-month fixed effects to 
control for period specific common shocks across units, as well as reporting area-specific 
linear time trends. We first estimate if the adoption of a low priority law affected the 
arrest behavior of local police officers. We find that adoption caused a reduction in 
arrests for misdemeanor marijuana offenses, but not felony offenses, consistent with the 
findings of Ross and Walker (2015). This result suggests that officers were heeding the 
mandate when adjusting their arrest behavior for only the relevant type of minor 
marijuana offenses. 
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 However, a closer examination of the data reveals that police did not change their 
behavior in the manner that would be expected given the policy change.  Specifically, we 
do not find that police reduced the number of arrests in West Hollywood.  In fact, our 
data shows evidence that the arrest pattern was flat in West Hollywood over this period.  
However, we find that there is a sharp increase in the non-adopting jurisdictions after the 
implementation of low priority laws.  There are several mechanisms we believe could be 
driving this result.  First, police may be unhappy with the passage of the low priority 
initiative and react by increasing arrests in other areas.  Alternatively, it could be that 
prior to the adoption of low priority laws, police were treating these offenses as a low 
priority, but the passage of the initiative served as a reminder to police that they should 
be arresting for these offenses, and hence increased arrests in other areas.6  
 Finally, we reexamine if there is a differential enforcement of the policy by police 
officers across race of the perpetrator, specifically white versus nonwhite individuals.  
We do not find that there was any change in the racial composition of the individuals 
arrested as a result of the adoption of a low priority law, suggesting that any racial bias 
police may have is not manifesting itself through the enforcement of these initiatives.  
Overall, our findings suggest that any bias that may be present is coming from a change 
in behavior across jurisdictions, not in a differential enforcement across races or a change 
in the enforcement of all types of drug crimes. 
                                                        
6 One mechanism through which this could occur is if localities are running into budgetary problems, and 
the passage of this law brings light onto another type of offense that can be used to generate revenues.  
Such a result would be consistent with previous work examining the use of traffic citations by local police 
agencies to generate revenues during economic downturns (Makowsky and Stratmann, 2009; Makowsky 
and Stratmann, 2011). 
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 The rest of the paper will proceed as follows.  Section II provides background 
information, particularly on low priority initiatives and the nature of the LASD.  Section 
III describes our data, while Section IV outlines our empirical strategy.  Results are 
presented in Section V.  We conclude and discuss policy implications in Section VI. 
 
II. Low Priority Laws and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department 
Low priority initiatives mandate that minor marijuana possession offenses be the lowest 
enforcement priority for local law enforcement agencies. There are a few key 
components to low priority laws. First, the law only affects minor marijuana possession 
offenses. Felony drug crimes, including felony-level marijuana possession and 
distribution offenses, were not affected by the policy change. Second, the law only 
affected offenses where marijuana was intended for adult personal use. Possession or 
selling of marijuana to minors is not affected by low priority initiatives. Finally, the 
mandate was only intended to affect the private use of marijuana, so any offenses 
committed on public property were not affected.7 
 Within Los Angeles County there are multiple police jurisdictions - local police, city 
police, county police, and state police – that oversee the enforcement of laws. Our data 
includes only arrests made in Los Angeles County by the LASD, which covers 
approximately 79 percent of the geographic area in LA County. In LA County, Santa 
Monica and West Hollywood were the only municipalities that adopted low priority 
initiatives in our sample period. Santa Monica has its own police agency, therefore any 
arrests or crimes reported in this area will not appear in our data set. However, West 
                                                        7 Most of the initiatives also have some language regarding who was responsible for making sure the 
ordinance was enforced by the local police agency. 
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Hollywood contracts with LASD for police services and changes in policing behavior in 
this area due to the policy change will be present in our data. The city of West Hollywood 
has 22 reporting districts out of a total of 943 reporting districts in LA County.  
This contractual relationship between the city of West Hollywood and the LASD 
for the provision of police services presents challenges to the implementation of the low 
priority law in West Hollywood for several reasons. First, for the LASD, complying with 
the West Hollywood resolution would mean changing their arrest behavior in one specific 
geographic area within their overall jurisdiction. We empirically test whether or not the 
LASD changed their behavior at all, if the policy change in West Hollywood caused them 
to alter their behavior selectively in the adopting jurisdiction, or if their behavior was 
altered uniformly throughout the county. 
Second, the West Hollywood City Council has no authority to compel the LASD 
to comply with the low priority mandate. The low priority initiative passed by the City 
Council is a resolution, which unlike an ordinance, is not a law and is therefore not 
legally binding. The city council member who proposed the resolution acknowledged 
this, stating that the resolution should “send a message to law enforcement that they 
should focus on more serious crimes.”8  
Furthermore, the LA County Sheriff is an elected official who generally 
establishes his or her own priorities.9 County commissioners often control police 
department budgeting decisions and therefore may have some indirect influence on the 
                                                        
8 From San Diego Tribune: http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2006/jun/20/west-hollywood-to-
consider-easing-enforcement-of/ 
9 Throughout our sample period, the LA County Sheriff was Lee Baca, who was Sheriff from 1998 to 2014.  
Therefore, we have no concerns that a change in the Sheriff caused a change in the overall goals and 
policies of the LASD.  See http://www.badgehistory.com/Sheriffs.html for a list of all LA Sheriffs. 
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sheriff’s operations, but even they may lack the authority to determine the priorities of 
police. As stated by one city council member, it is unusual for a contracting city to 
specify which laws for police to enforce and which to ignore.10 However, given the fact 
that the Sheriff is an elected official, he may choose to follow the resolution if he believes 
that such a law reflects the preferences of the electorate and will help him in his 
reelection efforts. 
Nonetheless, the West Hollywood resolution includes a provision that attempts to 
ensure the police are following the decree; it directs the Public Safety Commission of the 
City of West Hollywood “to conduct annual reviews of Sheriff Department statistics 
related to enforcement activities related to marijuana offenses,” and to present those 
findings to the City Council periodically.11 In addition, if the LASD refuses to heed to 
mandate, the city of West Hollywood could discontinue its contract for law enforcement 
with the LASD and use another police department, or create their own. This possibility 
may also serve to incentivize the LASD to comply with the resolution, especially if their 
objective is to maximize their operating budget.   
One question that frequently surrounds the implementation of low priority 
mandates is whether or not police departments are already deprioritizing low level 
marijuana offenses. If police are already considering enforcement of marijuana 
misdemeanors as a low priority, then we would see no effect of the law on arresting 
behavior of police. This may have been the case in West Hollywood; as a sheriff deputy 
who works in West Hollywood stated that officers “use their own judgment in small-time 
                                                        
10 From LA Times: http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/20/local/me-pot20 
11 The resolution can be found at: http://www.weho.org/Home/ShowDocument?id=826 
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pot cases.”12  Ross and Walker (2015) found evidence that adopting jurisdictions in 
California did have fewer arrests for misdemeanor marijuana offenses, but the reductions 
were small and estimates suggest only approximately 300 additional hours of time were 
created through the reduction in arrests. 
However, if small marijuana possession offenses were already a low priority, so 
low that officers did not consider arresting for this, the passage of the low priority 
initiative in West Hollywood may have served as a reminder to police to arrest 
individuals for these offenses.  An individual found with less than 28.5 grams of 
marijuana is subject to a fine only of approximately $100, with fees not to exceed $485.13  
Possession offenses above this amount, that are misdemeanor level offenses, carry a 
maximum fine of $500 and six months in jail.14  Thus, it is possible that this policy may 
have an unintended effect on arrest behavior in other non-adopting jurisdictions as it 
reminded the LASD that these possession offenses could be used to generate revenues 
through the fines. 
A final challenge to the implementation of the low priority initiative in West 
Hollywood is that, like many other low priority initiatives, the West Hollywood 
resolution does not specify limits to the amounts of marijuana that should be exempted. It 
merely states that “small amounts” should be ignored. This ambiguity may diminish the 
effectiveness of the resolution because of the difficulty it creates for police in 
implementing the mandate, and it may also allow police to differentially enforce the low 
                                                        
12 From LA Times: http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/20/local/me-pot20 
13 In 2011, California changed its laws so that possession of less than 28.5 grams of cannabis was 
considered an infraction, not a misdemeanor.  However, during our entire sample period, this was classified 
as a misdemeanor and therefore this change should not affect our results. 
14 http://www.canorml.org/camjlaws.html 
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priority resolution, particularly across identifying features of perpetrators (e.g. race). Our 
arrest data provided by the LASD separately identifies misdemeanor arrests for marijuana 
possession and arrests for felony possession, distribution or intent to sell marijuana. We 
will estimate the effect of the low priority mandate separately for these two types of 
marijuana arrests with the belief that the policy should only affect misdemeanor crimes.   
 
III. Data 
Our primary data consist of the universe of arrest records from the LASD between 2000 
and 2007, which we obtained through a research agreement.15 Each arrest record 
identifies the type of offense, the geographic location of the arrest (reporting district) and 
a time stamp for when the arrest took place. Arrests appear in 943 reporting districts in 
Los Angeles County, of which 22 reporting districts lie within the city of West 
Hollywood. The reporting districts within West Hollywood will be our treated units for 
the empirical analysis. The low priority resolution in West Hollywood was passed in June 
2006 and was to take effect immediately. Therefore, our treatment time period pertains to 
any arrest made beginning July 1, 2006.  
 We are interested in identifying changes in the likelihood of a marijuana arrest 
before and after the low priority mandate took effect. The arrest records differentially 
identify misdemeanor marijuana possession from felony marijuana possession. We will 
treat these two types of marijuana arrests as different outcomes under the premise that the 
low priority mandate should have been enforced on minor possession of marijuana 
offenses (i.e. misdemeanor offenses) but not felony possession.  
                                                        
15 The LASD has decided not to release any extracts for more recent years.  
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Summary statistics 
 Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis for 
the entire 2000-2007 time period. Panel A shows the means and standard deviations of 
the variables for the full sample arrest records as well as separately for reporting districts 
affected by the low priority mandate and reporting districts not affected by the low 
priority mandate. Each observation in the data is an individual arrest record, of which 
there are more than 2.5 million. There are 52,672 total arrests in low priority reporting 
districts and 2,491,622 arrests in reporting districts not affected by the low priority 
mandate. The variable nonwhite is a binary indicator (=1) if the arrested individual was 
identified as a race other than white. The race identifier was missing for a large number 
of arrests. Of the 725,925 arrest records that identified the race of the individual arrested, 
78.9% were nonwhite.16  However, in West Hollywood where the reporting districts were 
subjected to the low priority initiative, less than half of arrests (46.9%) pertained to 
nonwhite individuals.  
  The variable “Low Priority Law” is an indicator (=1) for reporting districts 
affected by the mandate. The first column in Panel A shows that 2.1% of all arrests came 
from low priority reporting districts. The variables “Misdemeanor Marijuana” and 
“Felony Marijuana” are also binary indicators for whether the arrest was for 
misdemeanor marijuana possession offense or felony marijuana possession offense, 
respectively. Of all arrests in the data, 1.8% were for misdemeanor marijuana possession 
and 0.3% were for felony marijuana possession. The fraction of arrests for misdemeanor 
                                                        
16 We will address the missing data for the race identifiers in our empirical analysis. 
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marijuana possession was twice as high in reporting districts with no low priority 
initiative and the fraction of felony marijuana arrests were three times as high in reporting 
districts with no low priority initiative.  
 One of our objectives is to test whether the LASD implemented the low priority 
initiative differentially across racial groups. Panel B shows the fraction of misdemeanor 
and felony marijuana arrests separately by white and nonwhite individuals. Across all 
reporting districts, the fraction of arrests for misdemeanor marijuana possession is about 
5% for both white and nonwhite individuals. The fraction of arrests for felony marijuana 
possession is 0.6% and 0.8% for white and nonwhite individuals, respectively.  
  
Unconditional Difference-in-Differences 
 Table 2 shows the unconditional average marijuana arrest rate in low priority 
reporting districts and reporting districts without a low priority mandate, both before and 
after the mandate had passed. Panel A shows the difference-in-differences outcomes for 
misdemeanor marijuana arrests and Panel B shows the outcomes for felony marijuana 
arrests.  The top portion of each panel displays the average fraction of arrests, with 
standard deviations in parentheses, for each group both before and after the mandate took 
effect. Directly below is the average difference for each group pre- and post-treatment 
along with standard errors (in brackets) for the t-test that the difference is equal to zero, 
assuming unequal variances. The unconditional difference-in-differences estimate is also 
presented with standard errors (in brackets) for the test that the difference-in-differences 
estimate is equal to zero.  
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 In Panel A, the fraction of misdemeanor marijuana arrests is higher after the 
mandate is passed in both low priority and non-low priority reporting districts, but the 
increase is only statistically different from zero in reporting districts that were not 
subjected to the low priority law. The difference-in-differences estimate is -0.009 and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. While the estimate is small in size, the baseline 
fraction of misdemeanor marijuana arrests for low priority districts from column 2 of 
Table 1 is only 0.009. This suggests that the likelihood of arrest for misdemeanor 
marijuana possession was significantly reduced after the low priority law took effect.  
 Panel B of Table 2 shows that the rate of felony marijuana arrests increased in all 
reporting districts after the mandate was passed, but as with misdemeanor marijuana 
possession, the increased arrest rate is only statistically different from zero in non-low 
priority reporting districts. Here, the unconditional difference-in-differences estimate is 
not statistically different from zero.  
 Table 2 suggests that there may be underlying differences in trends regarding the 
likelihood of arrest for marijuana possession. In order to visually inspect the trends in 
marijuana arrest, we aggregated the “Misdemeanor Marijuana” binary variable to 
monthly observations pertaining to reporting districts that were subjected to the low 
priority initiative and reporting districts that were not. This creates two time series where 
each observation reflects the fraction of all arrests that were for misdemeanor marijuana 
possession in a particular month. These series are plotted over the sample period in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
 Figure 1 shows the series for reporting districts subject to the low priority 
initiative and Figure 2 displays the series for reporting districts that were not subject to 
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the low priority initiative. In both figures, the dashed line identifies the average 
misdemeanor marijuana arrest rate, the solid lines are 95% confidence bands, and the 
vertical line identifies the month in which the low priority initiative took effect. The 
difference in the two series is striking. While there is variation in the arrest rate over time 
in both figures, both follow a similar trend before West Hollywood implemented a low 
priority initiative but there is a strong upward spike following adoption in non-adopting 
districts in Figure 2 and only a small, perhaps insignificant, upward trend in adopting 
districts in Figure 1 following the initiative.  
 These figures visually confirm that there was a significant increase in 
misdemeanor marijuana arrests following the law in reporting districts that were not 
subjected to the low priority initiative. These trends may foreshadow our main results 
from the regression analysis in that the reduction in the likelihood of misdemeanor 
marijuana arrest from our regression estimates is not due to fewer arrests in adopting 
jurisdictions, but to a slower rate of growth in the arrest rate in comparison to other, non-
adopting reporting districts.  
 
IV. Empirical Specification 
Our identification strategy relies on a standard difference-in-differences approach 
that accounts for a large amount of unobserved heterogeneity in a panel data setting. To 
estimate the effect of the low priority initiative on arrests, our most saturated and 
conservative model has the following specification: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎 + 𝜏𝜏𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎            (1) 
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where 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∈ {0,1} is a binary indicator for the type of arrest made (e.g., misdemeanor 
marijuana arrest, felony marijuana arrest) for arrest record a in reporting district i and 
period t. The data for the outcome variable is comprised of the entire population of arrest 
records made by the LASD for all types of crimes. Therefore, the model should be 
interpreted as predicting the likelihood of a particular type of arrest relative to all possible 
arrests.  
 Our specification is therefore simply a linear probability model with a binary 
dependent variable for the type of arrest that was made. Presumably, it would be 
desirable to express the dependent variable as a rate. However, this is not feasible given 
the structure of our data. Constructing the dependent variable as an arrest rate as the 
number of arrests per population in a reporting district is not possible because population 
data by reporting district is not available. It is also not possible to calculate a clearance 
rate (arrests/number of reported crimes) because data on reported criminal possession of 
marijuana does not exist.    
 Our specification controls for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity specific to 
each reporting district with reporting district fixed effects, 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎. The time period indexed by 
t is a year-month combination for which there are 96 months between 2000 and 2007. 
Year-month fixed effects, denoted by 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎, capture period-specific shocks that are common 
to all reporting districts. Reporting district-specific linear time trends are denoted as 𝜏𝜏𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎. 
The standard errors, 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, are clustered by reporting district. 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∈ {0,1} is an indicator 
that identifies whether a reporting district is subject to the low priority initiative and 
𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∈ {0,1} is an indicator that identifies the post-treatment period. Our coefficient of 
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interest is 𝜃𝜃, which is the standard difference-in-differences estimator in in this 
framework.  
We are also interested in whether the low priority law was differentially enforced 
across race. We amend Equation (1) by including an indicator 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 for whether the 
suspect is recorded as being nonwhite (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1) or white (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0).17 This 
indicator is then interacted with the components of our model that produces the 
difference-in-differences estimator. The resulting model takes the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + Π1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + Π2𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + Π3𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + Π4𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎 + 𝜏𝜏𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎 + 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎                (2) 
 
A nonzero estimate of Π4would indicate that the low priority law was implemented 
differentially for white versus nonwhite suspects.  
 
V. Results 
Impact of Low Priority Laws on Arrest Outcomes 
 Tables 3 and 4 present our main results for the effect of low priority laws on the 
arrest behavior of officers of the LASD. The tables are identically structured but the 
dependent variable in Table 3 is an indicator for whether the arrest was for misdemeanor 
marijuana possession and the dependent variable in Table 4 is an indicator for whether 
the arrest was for felony marijuana possession. The columns of the tables are parameter 
estimates from variations of the model specified in Equation (1), where each column                                                         
17 We have also estimated models that differentiate Black, White, Hispanic, Asian and Other but find no 
differences across these groups. Therefore, we pool all nonwhite individuals for this analysis.  
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accounts for different components of the unobserved heterogeneity. Column (1) includes 
only reporting district fixed effects, column (2) adds time fixed effects and column (3) 
estimates the full model specified with Equation (1) that also has reporting district-
specific linear trends. Each model is estimated with least squares with the standard errors 
clustered by reporting district.  
 While there is no effect of low priority laws on felony marijuana arrests in Table 
4, in Table 3, the likelihood of a misdemeanor marijuana arrest is significantly lower in 
reporting districts with low priority laws once reporting district fixed effects are included. 
Similar to the unconditional estimates in Table 2, the rate of misdemeanor marijuana 
arrests is higher after the low priority initiative passed in all reporting districts. Our 
coefficient of interest is found in the row labeled LPL*Post. The coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant in columns (1)-(3). The coefficient in column (3) is -0.0072, 
which is a large reduction in the rate of misdemeanor marijuana arrests relative to the 
baseline of 0.0009 for reporting districts with low priority laws found in Table 1.  
 Figures 1 and 2 hint that any reduction in the likelihood of misdemeanor 
marijuana arrest from a difference-in-differences estimate would come from a relatively 
higher rate of arrest in reporting districts that were not subjected to the low priority 
initiative after it was passed, not through an absolute reduction in misdemeanor 
marijuana arrests in reporting districts in West Hollywood. The arrest rate clearly spikes 
higher in Figure 2 after the initiative passed in reporting districts not subjected to the 
initiative.  
 This finding relates to a growing literature regarding behavior in general within 
the criminal justice system.  While policy makers may write laws following their 
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preferences and/or the preferences of their constituents, at the end of the day it is up to 
those parties within the criminal justice system to either enforce these laws appropriately 
or not.  For example, while sentencing guidelines may be enacted, it is up to the judges to 
follow these policies (see Tonry (2008) for a discussion of the behavior and enforcement 
of these policies).  Therefore, the spike in arrests in those jurisdictions that did not enact a 
low priority law suggests that police are adjusting their behavior by arresting more in 
areas without the policy, possibly as a subtle form of protest against a policy they do not 
like.  Alternatively, the passage of the low priority initiative in West Hollywood may 
have reminded police of this offense for which they can arrest individuals, and through 
these arrests generate revenue through fines.  This argument would suggest that police 
may be adjusting their behavior to generate revenue, consistent with research regarding 
traffic citations (Makowsky and Stratmann, 2009; 2011). 
 The source of identification for our difference-in-differences estimate can easily 
be seen by plotting the residuals of the models that account for the unobserved 
heterogeneity but do not include variables for the low priority law, the post-adoption 
indicator, or the interaction. Figures 3-5 plot the residuals by month for the models 
estimated from columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 where LPL, Post, and LPL*Post are excluded. 
The dashed line is the average residual and the solid lines are the 95% confidence interval 
bands. Residuals pertaining to low priority reporting districts are plotted in blue and 
residuals pertaining to the other reporting districts are plotted in black. The vertical line 
identifies the month in which the low priority initiative took effect.  
 Figure 3 shows the residuals when only reporting district fixed effects are 
included, Figure 4 shows the residuals after adding time fixed effects, and Figure 5 shows 
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the residuals after also including linear trends. Much of the variation in Figures 1 and 2 
remains in Figure 3 when only reporting district fixed effects are included in the model. 
Including time effects and reporting district-specific linear trends in Figures 4 and 5 
wipes out some of the variation, but there is still enough variation to identify a relatively 
higher arrest rate in non-adopting jurisdictions. This confirms that the apparent reduction 
in misdemeanor marijuana arrest rates due to the low priority law is driven by a large 
increase in the arrest rates in other reporting districts after the law took place. 
  
 
Low Priority Laws and Race 
Tables 5 and 6 estimate variations of the specification to include indicators for the race of 
the suspect in Equation (2) and have a similar structure to Tables 3 and 4. The columns of 
the tables increasingly add additional components to control for possible unobserved 
heterogeneity, with column (3) estimating the specification as written in Equation (2). 
The dependent variable in Table 5 is an indicator (=1) if the arrest was for a misdemeanor 
marijuana possession offense and the dependent variable in Table 6 is an indicator (=1) if 
the arrest was for felony marijuana possession. The test for racial differences in the 
implementation of the initiative can be seen by inspecting the coefficients in the row for 
LPL*Post*Nonwhite.  
 There appears to be no statistically significant evidence that the LASD 
differentially implemented the law for white individuals versus nonwhite individuals. The 
coefficient on LPL*Post*Nonwhite is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but 
never statistically different from zero. The estimates do suggest, however, that a larger 
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fraction of misdemeanor marijuana arrests in West Hollywood are nonwhite individuals 
in all time periods (positive coefficient on LPL*Nonwhite) and that the misdemeanor 
marijuana arrest rate declined for nonwhites across all reporting districts after the 
initiative passed (negative coefficient on Post*Nonwhite).  
 As we saw in the summary statistics, the race identifier for arrested suspects is 
missing for a large number of observations. Our results in Tables 5 and 6 would be biased 
if the race identifier is not missing at random and the LASD systematically did not report 
the race of certain suspects during marijuana arrests (i.e. do not report race for black 
individuals only). To investigate this issue, we return to our main specification in 
Equation (1) and estimate that model on two subsamples of the data – the subsample 
where race is missing and again on the subsample where race is non-missing. The 
estimates are presented in Table 7. 
 Columns (1) and (3) of Table 7 estimate Equation (1) on the sample of data where 
race is missing and columns (2) and (4) estimate Equation (1) on the sample of data 
where race is non-missing. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for misdemeanor 
marijuana arrest in columns (1) and (2) and the dependent variable is a binary indicator 
for felony marijuana arrest in columns (3) and (4). As in Table 3, the coefficient on 
LPL*Post is negative and statistically significant but is substantially more negative on the 
sample of data where race is non-missing. This suggests that the implementation of the 
low priority law was “more successful” when the LASD recorded the perpetrator’s race. 
We interpret these findings as evidence the LASD did not try to hide any racial bias in 
differentially implementing the law by not recording the individual’s race.    
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 Additionally, notice that the coefficient on Post is negative in column (1) of Table 
7 (where race is missing) just as it was in the full specification of Table 3 (using the full 
sample), but the coefficient on Post is positive in column (2) of Table 7 (where race is 
non-missing). This shows that misdemeanor marijuana arrests were more frequent in the 
post period after the law took effect when race was actually recorded. Therefore, perhaps 
the LASD was more careful in recording race when arresting individuals for 
misdemeanor marijuana violations once they were under the scrutiny of the new law. 
Lastly, and similar to Table 4, the coefficient on LPL*Post is not statistically different 
from zero in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 where the dependent variable is an indicator 
for felony marijuana arrest.    
 
VI. Conclusions 
We utilize novel data pertaining to the universe of arrest records from the Los Angeles 
Sheriff’s Department between January 2000 and December 2007 to investigate the 
adoption of a low priority initiative by West Hollywood, California in June 2006. The 
adoption of the low priority initiative mandated the LA Sheriff’s Department, West 
Hollywood’s primary policing agency, to de-emphasize the enforcement of misdemeanor 
marijuana possession crimes. The mandate impacted 22 of the 943 reporting districts for 
which the LA Sheriff’s Department has jurisdiction and made arrests in our data.  
 We estimate the impact of the low priority initiative on the likelihood of arrest for 
misdemeanor and felony marijuana possession, separately, using a difference-in-
differences framework in a panel data setting that absorbs a large amount of unobserved 
heterogeneity. While we find no effect of the initiative on felony marijuana arrests, we 
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find relatively large declines in the rate in which arrests are made for misdemeanor 
marijuana possession in reporting districts that were subjected to the mandate. However, 
the negative effects of the low priority initiative on misdemeanor marijuana possession 
are not due to an absolute drop in the arrest rate in West Hollywood, but instead reflect a 
large increase in the arrests rate for misdemeanor possession in reporting districts not 
affected by the initiative. That is, the rate at which the LA Sheriff’s Department arrested 
individuals for marijuana possession outside of West Hollywood increased dramatically 
after the initiative was passed but officers did not increase (or decrease) the arrest rate of 
individuals as much in reporting districts within West Hollywood.  In one regard the 
initiative has failed, as the arrest rate for marijuana possession increased in areas other 
than West Hollywood after the law passed but it succeeded in the sense that the LA 
Sheriff’s Department did not enforce the laws with the same increased intensity within 
West Hollywood.  
 For a large fraction of the arrest records, we also have a race identifier that allows 
us to test whether or not the initiative was differentially implemented. While we find no 
statistically significant evidence that the low priority law was differentially implemented 
the law across race, we do find that a larger fraction of misdemeanor marijuana arrests in 
West Hollywood are nonwhite and that the misdemeanor marijuana arrest rate declined 
for nonwhites across all reporting districts after the initiative passed. We provide some 
evidence that these findings are not driven by the LA Sheriff’s Department trying to hide 
any racial bias in differentially implementing the law by not recording the individual’s 
race.   
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 Our results have several important implications for the study of police behavior 
and the adoption of policy related to law enforcement.  First, our finding that the adoption 
of a low priority initiative in West Hollywood caused police to increase arrests in other 
areas raises several important questions and implications regarding police behavior.  One 
explanation for this increase is that the LASD did not agree with the initiative passed by 
West Hollywood, and reacted by arresting more individuals in other jurisdictions.  
Alternatively, it could be that these laws were already the lowest priority of the LASD, so 
much so that they were not even thinking to arrest for minor marijuana offenses.  
Therefore, the adoption of the low priority mandate by West Hollywood reminded police 
officers to arrest for this activity, and they did so in other jurisdictions.  This may be 
especially true if once the initiative was passed, the LASD viewed arresting individuals 
for more minor marijuana offenses as another source of revenue when the recession 
began. 
 In addition, our findings have important implications for the enforcement of 
“soft” laws or informal agreements (Lazzarini et al., 2004; Gill and Marion, 2013).  
While the West Hollywood City Council may have voted to make these minor marijuana 
possession offenses the lowest priority, the LASD does not report to the West Hollywood 
City Council.  Therefore, the initiative can be seen almost as an indicator of preferences 
of the local jurisdiction, with no formal mechanism through which the City Council can 
hold the LASD accountable.  Despite this, the LASD followed the instructions of the 
West Hollywood City Council and did not increase arrests for minor marijuana 
possession offenses in West Hollywood like they did in other jurisdictions.    
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A 
    
 Full Sample Low Priority Law = 1 Low Priority Law = 0 
Nonwhite 0.789 0.469 0.797 
 (0.408) (0.499) (0.402) 
Low Priority Law 0.021 -- -- 
 (0.142)   
Misdemeanor Marijuana 0.018 0.009 0.018 
 (0.133) (0.096) (0.133) 
Felony Marijuana 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.052) (0.038) (0.052) 
Observations 2544305 52672 2491633 
    
Panel B 
    
  Nonwhite = 1 Nonwhite = 0 
Misdemeanor Marijuana  0.050 0.051 
  (0.218) (0.220) 
Felony Marijuana  0.008 0.006 
  (0.088) (0.077) 
Observations  572991 152934 
Note: Entries are the sample mean with standard deviation in parentheses. There are 725925 non-missing 
entries for the race identifier.  
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Table 2: Unconditional Differences in Marijuana Arrests 
 
Panel A 
  LPL = 0 LPL = 1 
 Full 
Sample 
Pre-
treatment 
Post-
Treatment 
Pre-
treatment 
Post-
Treatment 
      
Misdemeanor 
Marijuana  
0.0180 
(0.1328) 
0.016 
(0.126) 
0.026 
(0.160) 
0.009 
(0.095) 
0.011 
(0.103) 
      
  Difference = 0.010*** 
        [0.0002] 
Difference = 0.002 
           [0.0011] 
   
  Difference-in-Difference = -0.009*** 
                                         [0.002] 
      
Panel B 
  LPL = 0 LPL = 1 
 Full 
Sample 
Pre-
treatment 
Post-
Treatment 
Pre-
treatment 
Post-
Treatment 
      
Felony 
Marijuana 
0.0027 
(0.0516) 
0.0025 
(0.050) 
0.0033 
(0.058) 
0.001 
(0.037) 
0.002 
(0.042) 
    
  Difference = 0.0009*** 
         [0.00009] 
Difference = 0.0004 
           [0.0004] 
      
  Difference-in-Difference = -0.0005 
                                             [0.0006] 
   
Note: LPL stands for Low Priority Law. Entries in the table reflect the proportion of misdemeanor and 
felony marijuana arrests for all arrests made by the Los Angeles County Sherriff’s Department for the 
full sample period 2000-2007. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Standard errors are in brackets for 
the t-tests for the difference in means equal to zero and assuming unequal variances. For the full sample 
N=2,544,305. ***indicates p-value < 0.01. 
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Table 3: The Effect of Low Priority Law on Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Low Priority Law -0.0028 -0.0035* -0.0036* 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) 
Post 0.0103*** 0.0180*** -0.0033* 
 (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0020) 
LPL*Post -0.0093*** -0.0091*** -0.0072*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0018) 
Constant 0.0160*** 0.0194*** 0.0192*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
Reporting District FE Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE No Yes Yes 
RD-specific linear 
time trends 
No No Yes  
    
R2 0.011 0.011 0.013 
Observations 2544305 2544305 2544305 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a misdemeanor marijuana arrest. Models are 
estimated by least squares with errors clustered by reporting district. Clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. LPL=1 if the reporting district is subject to the Low Priority Law. Post=1 after the law took 
effect. FE stands for fixed effects and RD stands for reporting district. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: The Effect of Low Priority Laws on Felony Marijuana Arrests 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Low Priority Law 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Post 0.0009*** 0.0018*** 0.0006 
 (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
LPL*Post -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0008 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Constant 0.0025*** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Reporting District FE Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE No Yes Yes 
RD-specific linear 
time trends 
No No Yes  
    
R2 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Observations 2544305 2544305 2544305 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a felony marijuana arrest. Models are estimated by 
least squares with errors clustered by reporting district. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. LPL=1 
if the reporting district is subject to the Low Priority Law. Post=1 after the law took effect. FE stands for 
fixed effects and RD stands for reporting district. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5: The Effect of Low Priority Law on Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests by Race 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Low Priority Law -0.0138** -0.0131** -0.0154*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0052) 
Post 0.0340*** 0.0907*** 0.0946*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0061) (0.0064) 
LPL*Post -0.0302*** -0.0297*** -0.0116** 
 (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0049) 
Nonwhite  0.0006 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
LPL*Nonwhite 0.0107** 0.0108** 0.0113** 
 (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0045) 
Post*Nonwhite -0.0082*** -0.0081*** -0.0061*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0023) 
LPL*Post*Nonwhite 0.0012 0.0013 -0.0013 
 (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0072) 
Constant 0.0435*** 0.0139*** 0.0129*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0032) (0.0029) 
Reporting District FE Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE No Yes Yes 
RD-specific linear time 
trends 
No No Yes  
    
R2 0.019 0.022 0.026 
Observations 725925 725925 725925 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a misdemeanor marijuana arrest. Models are 
estimated by least squares with errors clustered by reporting district. Clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. LPL=1 if the reporting district is subject to the Low Priority Law. Post=1 after the law took 
effect. FE stands for fixed effects and RD stands for reporting district. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: The Effect of Low Priority Laws on Felony Marijuana Arrests by Race 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Low Priority Law 0.0004 0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Post 0.0028*** 0.0079*** 0.0055*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0019) 
LPL*Post -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0008 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0026) 
Nonwhite 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
LPL*NW 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Post*NW -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
LPL*Post*NW -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0026 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) 
Constant 0.0069*** 0.0026*** 0.0024*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Reporting District FE Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE No Yes Yes 
RD-specific linear 
time trends 
No No Yes  
    
R2 0.006 0.006 0.007 
Observations 725925 725925 725925 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a felony marijuana arrest. Models are estimated by 
least squares with errors clustered by reporting district. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. LPL=1 
if the reporting district is subject to the Low Priority Law. Post=1 after the law took effect. NW stands for 
Nonwhite, FE for fixed effects and RD for reporting district. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: The Effect of Low Priority Laws: Race Identifier Missing vs Non-missing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrest Felony Marijuana Arrest 
 Race Missing Race Non-missing Race Missing Race Non-missing 
Low Priority Law -0.0011 -0.0101** -0.0002 0.0010 
 (0.0009) (0.0045) (0.0002) (0.0017) 
Post -0.0400*** 0.0900*** -0.0010** 0.0047** 
 (0.0014) (0.0058) (0.0004) (0.0019) 
LPL*Post -0.0057*** -0.0100*** -0.0004 -0.0019 
 (0.0013) (0.0038) (0.0003) (0.0014) 
Constant 0.0191*** 0.0129*** 0.0020*** 0.0024*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
Reporting District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RD-specific linear 
time trends 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 0.015 0.026 0.005 0.007 
Observations 1818380 725925 1818380 725925 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a misdemeanor marijuana arrest in columns (1) and 
(2). The dependent variable is a binary indicator for a felony marijuana arrest in columns (3) and (4). 
Columns (1) and (3) estimate the models on the sample of data where the race identifier is missing. 
Columns (2) and (4) estimate the models on the sample of data where the race identifier is non-missing. 
Models are estimated by least squares with errors clustered by reporting district. Clustered standard errors 
are in parentheses. LPL=1 if the reporting district is subject to the Low Priority Law. Post=1 after the law 
took effect. FE stands for fixed effects and RD stands for reporting district. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
